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The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law  
By Richard S. Kay (2014, The Catholic University) 
ANTHONY W. BRADLEY * 
It has been “described as an ‘unavoidable paradox in English history, a 
patently unconstitutional act which stands as perhaps the greatest 
monument to the victory of English constitutionalism.’”1 The constitutional 
conflicts in England which ran through much of the seventeenth century 
were fueled by an extreme religious division between Roman Catholics 
and the Protestants, who wished to maintain the Church of England’s 
independence from Rome.2 The conflicts reached their height in a dramatic 
period in 1688–89 when the Catholic James II was forced out of the 
country, leaving behind a short-lived vacuum in which there was, in effect, 
no monarch on the English throne and no legitimately convened Parliament 
at Westminster.3 This period has attracted many scholars, including the 
great F. W. Maitland who summarized the course of events in 1688–89 and 
continued:  
[n]ow certainly it was very difficult for any lawyer to argue 
that there had not been a revolution. Those who conducted 
the revolution sought, and we may well say were wise in 
seeking, to make the revolution look as small as possible, to 
make it as like a legal proceeding, as by any stretch of 
ingenuity it could be made. But to make it out to be a 
perfectly legal act seems impossible.4 
In his book, Professor Richard Kay has reminded us of the intense 
discussions that took place as events in England moved to their early 
conclusion. While the eventual outcome of those events may be seen over 
the course of the eighteenth and later centuries, Kay is to be congratulated 
on having made an original study of this crucial period. The main 
argument in the book is given life with a remarkable collection of 
                                                                                                                     
* Emeritus Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Edinburgh; Visiting Fellow, Institute of 
European and Comparative Law, University of Oxford. 
1 RICHARD S. KAY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND THE CONTINUITY OF LAW 14 (2014) 
(quoting HOWARD NENNER, BY COLOUR OF LAW: LEGAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN 
ENGLAND, 1660–1689, at 173 (1977)). 
2 KAY, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
3 Id. at 54. 
4 F. W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 284 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1955) (1908). 
 
1686 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:5 
contemporary illustrations, including apposite quotations from the 
speeches, debates, pamphlets, and diaries of the parliamentarians of the 
late seventeenth century. Kay guides us skillfully through the wealth of 
original material that has survived for some 350 years and is accessible to 
scholars today. 
In a broad sense, the book is a contribution to studies on the nature of 
revolutions, the foundations of legal systems, and transitional justice. It 
examines how a fundamental change in the basic structure of government, 
the law, and justice could take place in England that would cause the least 
possible damage to the established institutions of the monarchy, 
Parliament, and the legal system. Thus the ‘glorious revolution’ was the 
outcome of a struggle for power in which the major actors wished to 
achieve their aims as far as possible through institutional means, and 
without bringing on a period of conflict that might lead to a popular, or 
republican, form of government. While a break with aspects of the 
immediate past proved unavoidable, this did not require an axe to be taken 
to all existing institutions, and it proved possible for these bodies to resume 
their accustomed authority with a minimum of interruption. As Kay puts it, 
while the opponents of James II ultimately prevailed in the struggle for 
power, “to preserve one aspect of the constitution—the indispensable role 
of Parliament—they were obliged to breach another—the hereditary right 
of the king.”5 Having “accomplished [the physical revolution] with relative 
ease[,] . . . [t]heir task now was to reconstruct the English constitution. 
Since, however, a principal feature of that constitution was its historical 
continuity, they had an incentive to leave no trace of what they had done.”6 
A crucial stage of the revolutionary process was the period between the 
ending of the legal authority of James II and the beginning of a new period 
of monarchical government. Kay defines this as the period between 
December 11, 1688, when James II could be taken (at least in political 
terms) as having abdicated the government, and February 13, 1689, when 
William and his wife Mary were proclaimed as a joint monarchy.7 In Kay’s 
view,8 this period of “[t]he Revolution created a true interregnum for the 
                                                                                                                     
5 KAY, supra note 1, at 53. 
6 Id. at 54. 
7 Id. at 234–35. 
8 This view is not shared by Sir Stephen Sedley, who reviewed Kay’s book in the London Review 
of Books and emphasised that there must have been an interregnum during the period of the civil war 
and Cromwell’s government, starting either from 1642 when the Long Parliament began to legislate 
without royal assent or at latest from 1649 when Charles I was executed, and continuing until the 
restoration of Charles II in 1660. Stephen Sedley, Smuggled in a Warming Pan, 37 LONDON REV. 
BOOKS 1, 5 (2015). This disagreement may depend on the meaning of the term, ‘true interregnum.’ 
Sedley’s position is not reflected in two other reviews of the book: James Allan, The Glorious 
Revolution & The Rule of Recognition, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 509, 511 (2015) and Nicolás Figueroa 
García-Herreros, Richard S. Kay, The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law, 65 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 724, 727 (2017) (book review). 
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first time in English legal history.”9 But during those two months there was 
necessarily an exciting pattern of events which made it possible for the 
successful protagonists to cross the chasm in two leaps. Kay explains the 
paradox by emphasizing that “legal regularity may itself comprise a 
significant social-political value.”10 “Such a revolution subverts its 
legitimacy by its own example,” and it was “a well-established political 
tradition and . . . [a] particular craving for stability and constitutional 
order” that caused “the revolutionaries to employ the rhetoric, if not the 
reality, of legal regularity.”11 
Kay describes in detail how Prince William of Orange was asked by 
the Lords and a gathering of commoners, including those who had sat in 
the Parliaments of Charles II, to summon not a Parliament but a 
Convention; circular letters from the Prince were issued to enable a form of 
election to be adopted to create a Convention, but when the Convention 
met on January 22, 1689, the assembly “was acutely conscious of the 
absence of a legal foundation for its meeting.”12 After much division of 
opinion, it was declared that King James II had “endeavoured to subvert 
the constitution” and, “having violated the fundamental laws,” had 
“abdicated the government” and the throne was vacant.13 This cleared the 
way for a second clutch of difficult questions to be answered before action 
could be taken to fill the vacuum in government; “[t]he prospect of a true 
dissolution of the constitution and an entirely new beginning was terrifying 
to the men of the Convention.”14 Should power be exercised by the people 
outside Parliament? “William Attwood, referring to a kind of law behind 
the law, thought there were situations when a king could lose his power 
without descent to a ‘confused multitude without order or connection.’”15 
In an impressive chapter at the heart of the book, Kay discusses 
difficulties for the continuity of the Crown that confronted the move to 
declare William and Mary a dual monarch,16 these included: the need to 
amend the traditional parliamentary formula that sought divine blessings 
upon the monarch and royal family, the drafting of a new oath to be sworn 
during the coronation service, and the choice of title of the joint monarchs 
(the phrase that was adopted referred to them as the “undoubted king and 
queen of this realm”).17 Underlying these matters was the thorny question 
of succession when one or both of the joint monarchs died: it was quickly 
                                                                                                                     
9 KAY, supra note 1, at 234. 
10 Id. at 19. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 74. 
13 Id. at 76.  
14 Id. at 114. 
15 Id. at 116. 
16 Id. at 124, 126–30. 
17 Id. at 132. 
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seen that joint tenancy at common law would not provide an appropriate 
answer. The question of the oaths to the new King and Queen proved even 
more difficult: Kay demonstrates why acceptance of their de facto 
authority was not considered to provide an affirmative justification of the 
Revolution.18 A posthumously published paper by Chief Justice Matthew 
Hale contained a prophetic remark: “The competition for the crown is a 
tender matter and interest and successes and reasons of state carry parties 
beyond the limits of settled rules, . . . not only where the right heir prevails 
but even where the usurper or intruder carries the day.”19 Kay argues that 
the controversy over the oaths revealed “the intensity” with which the 
statesmen in 1689 “wished to maintain, even in the teeth of insuperable 
obstacles, the continuity of the rule of law.”20 Once the reign had been 
proclaimed and it was possible for the first Parliament of the reign to meet, 
much time was spent on formulating a statute that recognized the authority 
of the joint monarchs and confirming the acts of the Convention 
Parliament.21 It proved to be impossible to avoid the conclusion that, in 
Kay’s words, “[t]he Convention did not act because of the authority of law; 
the authority of law is inferred from the Convention’s acts.”22 But 
notwithstanding the Recognition Act, there continued to be issues relating 
to executive authority during the transition and to the machinery for 
vesting the new regime with legitimacy; and these were seen in the debates 
around what became the Validation Act of 1690. But even this further 
attempt did not overcome “[t]he contradictions involved in attempting to 
establish a revolutionary Crown and Parliament while maintaining the 
pretense of legal continuity.”23  
The disabling effect of such contradictions was moderated by the steps 
taken by William in reconstructing the existing judiciary, many of whom 
had been appointed to hold their office at the King’s pleasure. Thus 
supporters of James II were replaced as Chief Justice of King’s Bench by 
Sir John Holt,24 and as Chief Baron of the Exchequer by Sir Robert 
Atkyns. These appointments “demonstrated a shrewd combination of 
judicial competence and political prudence.”25 Kay comments: “If Holt 
represents the most successful elision of the contradictions of law and 
revolution, Atkyns may represent the plainest instance of their 
inevitability.”26 The new judges were needed on political grounds, and in 
                                                                                                                     
18 Id. at 150. 
19 Id. at 151 (referencing Lincoln’s Inn Library MS 579 f.25). 
20 Id. at 153. 
21 Id. at 154–55. 
22 Id. at 175. 
23 Id. at 180. 
24 Id. at 192–94. 
25 Id. at 195. 
26 Id. at 199. 
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office they were faced with pending cases that had arisen from everyday 
transactions that had been affected by the change of regime. One issue 
raised by those cases was the need for Cambridge University to be 
permitted to award degrees retrospectively.27 But in a time of political 
tension, more difficult questions arose in respect of maintaining public 
order and the authority of criminal law. Cases arose regarding matters such 
as James’s disputed holdings in the East India Company and the Royal 
African Company,28 and whether in 1693 privateers on the high seas could 
rely on commissions signed by James.29 As for the Church of England, 
which had to enforce a modified form of oath declaring allegiance to the 
new regime, most clergy took the oath, but the bishops were not united.30 
Sancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury, refused to preside at the coronation 
service for William and Mary,31 and left his residence in Lambeth palace to 
make way for his successor only when the Attorney-General sought to 
exclude Sancroft by obtaining a writ of intrusion against him.32 
Kay concludes that “every legal system originates in events that are 
not, themselves, authorized by law,”33 but at some point thereafter the new 
regime comes to be accepted and arguments of fundamental illegality lose 
their force. The demagogic utterances of Sacheverell in 1709, and the 
degree of public support he received at a time when there was “a rising tide 
of Tory and high church sentiment against the Whig Junto government,”34 
led to the preacher’s impeachment for condemning those who had in 1689 
exercised justified resistance to an oppressive king—an impeachment 
which renewed the debate on the issues of principle that separated Whigs 
from Tories. On the case for a popular rebellion, Sir Robert Walpole 
accepted that resistance “ought never to be thought of, but when an utter 
subversion of the laws of the realm threaten the whole frame of a 
constitution and no redress can otherwise be hoped for.”35 
The past is of course another country but, surprisingly, Kay cites a 
House of Commons debate in 1988 to demonstrate that even with the 
passing of time, which may have reduced discussion of the Revolution to 
the level of historical curiosity, “all of the tensions at the center of the 
revolutionary decisions were still there—between change and tradition, 
                                                                                                                     
27 Id. at 235. 
28 Id. at 246. 
29 Id. at 265–71 (discussing the legality of a commission issued by King James after his 
abdication). 
30 Id. at 215–16.  
31 Id. at 131. 
32 Id. at 225–26. 
33 Id. at 272. 
34 Id. at 275. 
35 Id. at 277. 
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theory and history, the exhilaration of unconfined action, and the comfort 
of constraining law.”36 
Is it fanciful to observe that this conclusion is not without some 
application to the remarkable decision of the United Kingdom’s Supreme 
Court in September 2019?37 Then the eleven Justices held unanimously 
that advice from Prime Minister Johnson to the Queen that Parliament 
should be prorogued was unlawful; that Parliament could resume its 
deliberations forthwith; and that Johnson’s attempt to end the session of 
Parliament prematurely and without reasonable justification was of no 
effect.38 Reliance on earlier precedents could well have excluded any 
attempt by the Justices to interfere with this act under the royal 
prerogative.39 But against this there were two principles—parliamentary 
sovereignty and parliamentary accountability—which did not permit 
recourse to royal power without reasonable justification if this would 
restrict the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions.40 
The 2019 decision by the Supreme Court did not indeed amount to a 
revolution. But the legal debate in and about the case brings to mind an 
insightful passage41 in which Kay defines two classes of lawyers dealing 
with events in 1689:  
[T]hose who wished the fewest changes in constitutional 
arrangements tended to refer to positive law which was 
specific, concrete, and historically identifiable—statutes, 
judgments, precedents. Advocates of more far-reaching 
changes in the distribution of constitutional authority were 
more likely to cite a vaguer and more abstract kind of law - 
natural law, broad principles, and the practices of an 
immemorial and thus unverifiable past.42  
Since the British constitution remains uncodified, it continues to 
develop 350 years after the Glorious Revolution; and fundamental 
questions that arise today may be resolved in a manner that would have 
been impossible in earlier times but which displays a parallel divergence 
between the need for change and the continuity of law. 
 
                                                                                                                     
36 Id. at 281. 
37 See R (Miller) v. Prime Minister/Cherry v. Advocate Gen. for Scotland [2019] 41 UKSC 3, 3 
(considering whether “the advice given by the Prime Minister to Her Majesty the Queen . . . that 
Parliament should be prorogued from a date between . . . was lawful”). 
38 Id. at 22, 24. 
39 Id. at 3, 12, 16. 
40 Id. at 16–18. 
41 James Allen, Glorious Revolution & the Rule of Recognition, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 509, 512 
(2015) (reviewing KAY, supra note 1).  
42 KAY, supra note 1, at 57–58. 
